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SPARROW AND LONE WOLF: HONORING
TRIBAL RIGHTS IN CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES
Abstract Tribal sovereignty and self-government are essential to Native American cul-
tural survival. Current limitations on Congress' plenary power in Indian affairs are inade-
quate to protect these core tribal rights. This Comment examines recent developments in
Canadian law and proposes legislation following the Canadian example to better protect
core tribal rights in the United States.
American Indian tribes were sovereign over their lands until
Europeans arrived five hundred years ago. As the United States devel-
oped, however, it gradually encroached on the sovereignty of Indian
tribes. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
had proclaimed the subservience of tribal sovereignty to that of the
United States. In Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, ' a case that has been called
the Indians' Dred Scott decision,2 the Court established Congress' ple-
nary power in Indian affairs, a power deemed substantial enough to
permit the abrogation of valid treaties,3 the taking of aboriginal lands,4
and even the termination of tribes as political entities.'
Tribal sovereignty and self-government are critical to the survival
and prosperity of Indian communities and culture. Under the plenary
power doctrine, however, Congress may infringe tribal rights to sover-
eignty and self-government at will. Although the plenary power doc-
trine has its roots in the notion that the United States is in a guardian
or trustee-like relationship with the tribes,6 courts consider the trust
obligations of Congress purely moral and not legally enforceable.7
This Comment calls for the United States to adopt new legislation
rejecting the remnants of Lone Wolf-era doctrine and restraining Con-
gress' exercise of plenary power over Native Americans. A recent
Canadian Supreme Court opinion provides a valuable guide. In Spar-
1. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
2. Lone Wolf "appeared to say the Indian tribes had acquired no rights by treaty which the
Congress was bound to respect." Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1173
(Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nichols, J., concurring), aff'd, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
3. Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 566.
4. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
5. See, eg., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335, 1338-39 (Ct. Cl.
1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
6. See, eg., Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 565-67; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85
(1886).
7. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1213, 1227 (1975).
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row v. The Queen, 8 the Canadian Court interpreted a 1982 amendment
to the Canadian Constitution and established that the Canadian fed-
eral government may not infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights without
strong justification. 9 According to the Canadian Court, the govern-
ment's substantial obligation to Aboriginal peoples requires strict judi-
cial scrutiny of national legislation to ensure that it meets the Crown's
honorable duties. 10
The United States should similarly recognize that certain core
rights1" are so important to tribal integrity and survival that Congress
should not infringe them without compelling need. If Congress can
incorporate some of Sparrow's principles and abandon the Lone Wolf
legacy, the United States may begin to better honor its solemn obliga-
tions to the new world's original inhabitants.
I. CONGRESS AND THE TRIBES: SOVEREIGNTY,
PATERNALISM, AND PLENARY POWER
Tribal sovereignty, congressional power, and congressional respon-
sibility for Indians are forces that have been in constant tension.
While sovereignty and self-government are essential tribal interests,
courts have not given them legal protection from congressional inter-
ference despite the United States' guardian-like duty toward Indians.
Further, because of constitutional doctrines peculiar to Indian law, the
Constitution is a weaker shield for Indians than for other Americans.
Through policy statements and the creation of substantive legal rights,
however, Presidents and Congress have espoused a policy that sup-
ports tribal sovereignty and self-determination. Finally, recent devel-
opments in Canadian law demonstrate a useful conception of the
relative status of Aboriginal rights and federal powers.
A. Tribal Sovereignty and the Plenary Power Doctrine
The "cornerstone" of Indian policy in the United States is that
native people have the right to exist as separate tribal groups with the
8. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
9. See Johnson, Fragile Gain" Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Toward
Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643 (1991) for an extensive discussion of the history and status of
Native American rights in the United States and Canada.
10. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1110.
11. As used in this Comment, "core" tribal rights are those which are critical to tribal
prosperity. These rights include sovereignty, self-government, and control of property. See infra
notes 115-16 and accompanying text. A more detailed exploration of the "core's" boundaries is




inherent power to rule themselves and their territory.' 2 These inher-
ent rights and powers were reserved to Indian tribes and promised by
the federal government in many of the treaties and agreements
between the tribes and the government.' 3 Tribal autonomy and sover-
eign rights to self-government are essential to Indian survival and pro-
gress." Through their exercise, tribes can establish governing
structures suited to their pressing current needs,15 maintain Indian
identity and culture, and attain economic stability.16
Tribal sovereignty under current Indian law is distinguishable from
sovereignty in international law.17 Early European political philoso-
phers saw Native Americans as the true owners of the new world who
could not be deprived of their lands under such claims as the discov-
erer's right or divine right.'8 Implicit in this recognition of ownership
was an acknowledgment of aboriginal sovereignty. 9 Under Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock2' and its modern progeny,2 however, Indian tribal
12. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 622 (1977) (Separate
Views of Indian Commissioners); D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 19 (2d ed. 1986).
13. See V. DELORiA, JR. & C. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE-PAST AND FUTURE OF
AMERICAN INDIAN SOvEREIGNTY 7-11 (1984); Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: .4
Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979,
1027-29 (1981).
14. See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 622 (the
"Separate Views of Indian Commissioners" states that sovereignty is critical for achieving Indian
self-sufficiency, a goal of paramount importance); V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 13,
at 244-45. On the nature and importance of political and economic liberty for American Indians
see generally R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL
LIBERTY (1980).
15. Deloria, What Indians Should Want Advice to the President, in INDIAN SELF-RULE 321
(. Philp ed. 1986).
16. See V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 13, at 244-59; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 622.
17. As used in this Comment, tribal sovereignty means the inherent authority to rule their
members and their territory. See C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW
54-55 (1987) for the various meanings of sovereignty in Indian law.
18. See eg., F. VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES 128 (J. Bate trans.
1917).
19. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 153 (1982) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK].
20. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The Supreme Court refused to review Congress' abrogation of a
valid Indian treaty because it said Congress had "plenary power" over Indian relations that was
not subject to judicial review.
21. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (Indian tribal sovereignty
"exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance"); see also Native
Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 687 F. Supp. 1380, 1392 (D. Alaska 1988), rev'd on
other grounds 918 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1990) ("As against Congress, tribal sovereignty is but a
stick in front of a tank .... "). See generally Note, Constitutional Law: Congressional Plenary
Power Over Indian Affairs-A Doctrine Rooted in Prejudice, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 117 (1983)
for a critique of the plenary power doctrine's constitutionality.
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sovereignty is subservient to Congress' plenary power.22 In the early
1950s, Congress went so far as to exercise its plenary power to disman-
tle tribes.2 3 The courts also curtail tribal sovereignty and self-govern-
ment whenever they deem such rights inconsistent with the
"overriding sovereignty" of the United States.24
Recent Supreme Court doctrine grounds congressional authority
over Indians in the enumerated powers of the Constitution, 25 particu-
larly the Indian commerce clause2 6 and the federal government's gen-
eral treaty-making power.27  No Indian law case to date has
invalidated a statute as beyond Congress' enumerated powers.2 8
B. Trust and Trust-Like Obligations
The Indian trust doctrine places the federal government in a guard-
ian or trustee-like relationship with the tribes. The relationship arises
22. The Court has variously used "plenary power" in Indian law to mean power that is
exclusive, power that is capable of preempting state action, and power that is unlimited.
Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
195, 196 & n.3 (1984).
Tribes currently exercise significant governmental powers. See C. WILKINSON, supra note 17,
at 53-54; Clinton, supra note 13, at 1065. However, sovereignty and self-government, unlike
property, are not constitutionally protected. Their infringement therefore raises no presumption
of invalidity or requirement for compensation. See Washington v. Confederated Bands and
Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979) (rejecting the claim that tribal
interest in self-government is a fundamental right).
Tribal sovereignty has historically provided significant protection against interference by states
in tribal affairs. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832) (Cherokee
Nation did not surrender its independence and right to self-government by associating with the
United States and therefore remained a distinct community in which a state's laws were
inapplicable). This Comment, however, focuses on limits to federal power.
23. See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953). Under the guise of "freeing" Indians from
federal supervision, Congress terminated approximately 109 tribes and caused the tribes to lose
over 1.3 million acres of land. Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 139, 151 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206-09 (1978).
25. Newton, supra note 22, at 231; see, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974)
(plenary power is "drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself");
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973) ("The source of federal
authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion, but... the power derives
from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making.").
For other constitutional powers historically relevant in Indian affairs, see generally, HANDBOOK,
supra note 19, at 209-12.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have Power... to regulate Commerce...
with the Indian Tribes.").
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties").
28. C. WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 82. But cf Clinton, supra note 13, at 999-1001
(suggesting that reliance on the Indian commerce clause as the primary source of congressional
power may make possible claims that Congress is acting outside that power).
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from the tribes' unique governmental status and the federal govern-
ment's superior power and control of Indian resources.29 Created by
the Court to protect important tribal interests,30 the doctrine contin-
ues to protect tribes from executive agencies. Paradoxically, however,
it is also one source of Congress' virtually unlimited power over
tribes. 31
As early as 1919, courts recognized that some circumstances create
legally enforceable trust obligations in the executive branch,32 and
have held executive agencies to strict fiduciary standards.33 Attempts
to hold Congress to similar standards, however, have failed.34 Courts
have found that the trust doctrine provides no legally enforceable
rights against Congress for breach of its trust duties.35 Even if a court
recognized such rights, the government has not waived its sovereign
29. HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 220-21; see also AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW
COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 4 ("[Ihe relationship which exists between the tribes and the
United States is premised on a special trust that must govern the conduct of the stronger toward
the weaker."). The trust doctrine also derives from attitudes of European cultural superiority.
See Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARv. L. Rlv. 422, 426-29
(1984) (criticizing the cultural superiority and control rationalizations of the trust doctrine and
suggesting instead a justification based on the duty to protect tribal autonomy).
30. See Chambers, supra note 7, at 1246-48.
31. Id. at 1226 (the "power of Congress recognized under the Lone Wolfrendition of the trust
responsibility is manifestly awesome, perhaps unlimited").
32. For example, agencies have trust obligations when managing some Indian land and
resources. See Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113-14 (1919) (administrative
disposal of Pueblo lands would be an act of confiscation, not of guardianship). For early
executive breach of trust cases see generally Chambers, supra note 7, at 1230-32.
33. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942); HANDBOOK, supra
note 19, at 226-28. Although the trust obligation does not apply to all executive dealings with
tribes, when a specific executive trust obligation arises, it is enforceable in the courts. See eg.,
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 546 (1980) (Mitchell 1) (General Allotment Act alone
does not create enforceable general executive fiduciary obligation); United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 224-26 (1983) (Mitchell I1) (When read together, statutes controlling agency
management of Indian timber resources give rise to a specific enforceable fiduciary obligation.
"[A] fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes such elaborate
control over forests and property belonging to Indians.").
34. Challenges to Indian legislation are justiciable, even if they have not been successful.
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); see also United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980) (conclusive presumption of congressional good faith
and nonjusticiability of Indian legislation "has long since been discredited in taking cases, and
... expressly laid to rest in [Weeks]").
35. See Chambers, supra note 7, at 1227; see also Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 607 F.2d 1335, 1339-40, 1344 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980). But cf.
Littlewolf v. Lujan, 877 F.2d 1058, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 837 (1990)
(suggesting that the trust responsibility may be relevant in equal protection challenges to
congressional exercises of plenary power). See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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immunity for congressional breach of trust claims.16 Because the gov-
ernment has not waived its sovereign immunity, courts have no juris-
diction to hear non-constitutional breach of trust claims.3 7
C. Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power
The Court applies peculiar constitutional doctrines to federal legis-
lation affecting Indians. These unusual doctrines arise from tribes'
unique position in our constitutional system and Congress' power over
them." The result is that tribal members are more vulnerable to con-
gressional abuses of power than are other citizens. These unique
applications are most apparent in certain fifth amendment cases: tak-
ings of property without just compensation, 9 and denial of equal pro-
tection under the due process clause.4°
In non-Indian cases, when a court finds a fifth amendment taking, it
looks closely at the compensation given for the property.41 In the
Indian context, however, two significant doctrines allow courts to
characterize land transactions as something other than takings.42
First, Indian property must have been "recognized" by Congress
before the Court will characterize it as "property" under the takings
clause; deprivations of unrecognized aboriginal property are therefore
not takings.43 Second, no taking occurs when Congress acts as a
trustee managing Indian property, rather than as a sovereign exercis-
ing eminent domain powers.44
36. See Menominee, 607 F.2d at 1341-43. Noting the general rule that the United States
must expressly consent to be sued, the Menominee court found no such consent for non-
constitutional congressional breach of trust claims.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) (The relationship
between Indians and the United States is "perhaps unlike that of any other two people in
existence.... [It] is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else.").
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g., United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935); see
also Newton, supra note 22, at 247-49.
40. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see, e.g., Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73
(1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
41. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 416-17 & n.30 (1980) (the
adequacy of compensation is determined according to objective facts and is a judicial, not a
legislative, question). For a discussion of the unique value of land to Indian tribes for
maintaining religious, cultural, and governmental integrity, and the consequent problems with
using European market-based value as the measure of compensation for Native American lands,
see Clinton, supra note 13, at 1040-44.
42. See Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis
of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR. L. REV. 245, 248-49 (1982).
43. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277-78 (1955).
44. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 415 (if Congress considered a particular measure
appropriate for protecting and advancing the tribe's interests, it would not be subject to just




Another peculiar rule applies in Indian equal protection cases. In
non-Indian cases, courts apply strict scrutiny to legislation targeted at
specific racial groups.4" Indian legislation necessarily singles out peo-
ple of a specific race for special treatment.' Nevertheless, because the
Court, in Morton v. Mancari, characterized Indians as political rather
than racial groups, courts review Indian legislation against a much
lower standard than that applied to other racially discriminatory
laws.47 Legislation need only be "tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians."4 "Unique obliga-
tion" refers to Congress' trust obligation, 9 and Congress' guardian-
like duty to legislate on behalf of Indians.50
The "tied rationally" standard, which limits all congressional exer-
cises of plenary power over Indians,"1 is similar to the deferential
rational basis standard in non-Indian equal protection cases.52 Under
a rational basis standard, legislation that does not affect a suspect class
See D. GETaCHS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 13-14. Congress' broad trustee powers are
not legally constrained by trust duties. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
45. See, eg., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967). See generally Johnson & Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L.
REv. 587, 591 (1979) (discussing equal protection doctrine in the non-Indian context).
46. See eg., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974) ("On numerous occasions this
Court specifically has upheld legislation that singles out Indians for particular and special
treatment.").
47. Id at 552-55. The Court first noted that the government's solemn commitment toward
Indians would be jeopardized by a determination that laws designed to help only Indians were
invidiously discriminatory on the basis of race. Id at 552. The Court then characterized
"Indians" in the statute as a political classification and found that a standard similar to the
rational basis test applied. Id at 553 n.24, 554.
48. "As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed." Id at
555; see also Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); Johnson & Crystal,
supra note 45, at 599.
49. Mancar, 417 U.S. at 553.
50. Id at 551.
51. Littlewolfv. Lujan, 877 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 837
(1990). Noting that Congress' power, while plenary, is not absolute, the Littlewolf court
subjected the legislation at issue to equal protection analysis. Id, (citing United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413, 414 n.28 (1980)).
The "tied rationally" standard can often work to Indians' disadvantage. See eg., United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Delaware Tribal Business CommL, 430 U.S. at 73. In
Antelope the Court upheld an Indian's conviction under a federal statute applicable only to
Indians. Conviction would have been impossible under the state law applicable to non-Indians.
The Court concluded that "the federal criminal statutes enforced here are based neither in whole
nor in part upon impermissible racial classifications." Antelope 430 U.S. at 646-47. In Weeks,
the Court held that Congress' unintentional exclusion of a group of Indians from a settlement
agreement was rationally related to Congress' unique responsibility. Weeks, 430 U.S. at 85,
89-90.
52. See Johnson & Crystal, supra note 45, at 599, 605-07 (arguing that the Mancari standard
is similar to, but somewhat more rigorous than minimal rational basis scrutiny).
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or a fundamental right is valid if legislators could reasonably conclude
that it furthers a legitimate government objective.5 3
D. National Policy: Rhetoric and Reality
Congress has historically established national Indian policy in a
number of different ways: by proclaiming principles that will guide
future action, by establishing rights and programs, and by providing
judicial remedies for past actions. Recent statements by the executive
branch and by Congress espouse tribal autonomy and self-determina-
tion54 as the fundamental principles of national Indian policy, but they
have not made such rights enforceable at law.
One of the strongest statements supporting self-determination is
President Nixon's 1970 message to Congress on Indian policy in
which he said "[t]he time has come ... for a new era in which the
Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions." 55
President Reagan reaffirmed this policy in 1983 and again in 1988.56
The American Indian Policy Review Commission, an investigating
body established by Congress, similarly proposed a strong Indian self-
determination policy in 1977.17
Congress' expressions of national Indian policy are sometimes lim-
ited to suggesting future legislation58 and, often, directing federal
53. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); see also Johnson & Crystal, supra note
45, at 590-91.
54. The policy of self-determination is "premised on the notion that Indian tribes are the
basic governmental units of Indian policy." HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 180. For a discussion
of the policy, see generally id. at 180-206.
55. R. NIXON, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1970). The statement read further, "[slelf-determination among the Indian people can
and must be encouraged without the threat of eventual termination.... [T]he goal of any new
national policy [must be] to strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy without threatening his
sense of community." Id. at 2-3.
56. Statement on Indian Policy, 1983 PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24); Statement by the Assistant
to the President for Press Relations on the President's Meeting with American Indian Leaders,
24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1614 (Dec. 12, 1988). President Bush's Secretary of the Interior,
Manuel Lujan, has also stressed self-determination as a major goal of the Department. See
Bureau of Indian Affairs Targeted for Major Interior Budget Initiatives, Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) No. 25, at B-13 (Feb. 6, 1991).
57. The Commission's "Policy for the Future" stated that one of the fundamental concepts
that must guide future policy determinations is "[t]hat Indian tribes are sovereign political
bodies, having the power to determine their own membership and power to enact laws and
enforce them within the boundaries of their reservations." AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW
COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 4.
58. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953) (suggesting future legislation to bring
about termination of tribes based on recommendations to be made by the Secretary of Interior).




agency action. 9 Even when these statements have the force of law,
however, they often do not establish actual programs or substantive
rights of action, but merely state a policy to guide Congress and the
executive.' Such a policy statement may nevertheless have profound
effect.61
Congress also addresses specific problems in Indian affairs by creat-
ing programs, such as those for Indian health and education,62 and
substantive rights.63 Moreover, when Congress has recognized the
possibility of unfairness in past dealings with tribes, it has enacted stat-
utes permitting judicial review of those past actions. 6  These remedial
statutes waive sovereign immunity65  and confer jurisdiction66 for
claims concerning particular substantive rights.67
The most important of these remedial Acts was the Indian Claims
Commission Act of 1946.68 The Act allowed the Indian Claims Com-
mission to review a broad class of claims including those "based upon
fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing
59. See, eg., American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469
(1978) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996 (West 1981)) (proclaiming the policy of the federal
government to protect inherent Native American rights to practice traditional religions).
60. If a statute does not plainly provide for private or tribal enforcement, policy statements
provide no cause of action. See, eg., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 455 (1988) (finding no congressional intent to create a cause of action in the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act).
61. A policy statement, H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953), launched one of the most
devastating periods in American Indian history, the "termination era," where Congress
dismantled over 100 tribal governments. For a discussion of the impacts of the termination era
see generally Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 23.
62. See, eg., HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 192-95.
63. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-63 (West 1983) (promoting the
stability of Indian tribes and families by protecting the interests of Indian children).
64. These judicial review statutes have taken two forms: special legislation for individual
claims and general legislation affecting entire classes of claims. Compare Act of June 3, 1920, ch.
222, 41 Stat. 738 (permitting only litigation by the Sioux Nation of treaty claims against the
United States); with Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (Commission
terminated in 1978) (giving the Commission jurisdiction to hear all claims that fell into five
general categories and were brought by groups of Indians against the United States).
65. HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 318-23. For examples of other waivers of sovereign
immunity applicable in Indian cases, see id.
66. Id. at 563-65. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335 (Ct. Cl.
1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980) shows the importance of explicitly conferring
jurisdiction. The court interpreted several jurisdictional statutes that could arguably have
covered non-constitutional congressional breach of trust cases before concluding it had no
jurisdiction. Id. at 1340-44.
67. HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 160-61.
68. Ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (Commission terminated in 1978).
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rule of law or equity.",69 For claims accruing after enactment, the stat-
ute gave jurisdiction to the Court of Claims.70
In summary, national policy toward Indians currently encourages
tribal self-determination. Under current United States law, however,
courts have no power to protect many core tribal rights from unjusti-
fied congressional interference. Neither the congressional trust obliga-
tion nor tribal rights to sovereignty and self-government are
enforceable in the courts.
II. CANADIAN LIMITS ON FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE
POWER: ENFORCING THE HONOR OF THE
CROWN
In contrast with the United States, Aboriginal and treaty rights of
First Nations71 are protected by the Canadian Constitution under a
1982 amendment.7 2 Section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act
states that "[t]he existing [A]boriginal and treaty rights of the
[A]boriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."73
The substance and scope of this proclamation were uncertain 74 until
the 1990 case of Sparrow v. The Queen.75 Sparrow concerned the lim-
its section 35(1) places on Parliament's power to make laws affecting
Aboriginal rights.76
Sparrow, a member of the Musqueam Band of Indians, was prose-
cuted and convicted for fishing with a net that was longer than federal
69. Id. at 1050; HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 161.
70. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1505 (West 1973); see also HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 161. The Court
of Claims' initial jurisdiction was less extensive than the Commission's. The Court of Claims,
however, retained its jurisdiction when the Commission was terminated in 1978. See
HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 161, 564-65.
71. In Canada a preferred term for Aboriginal communities is First Nations. Groups that
would be called tribes in the United States are frequently referred to as bands. See Johnson,
supra note 9, at 645 n.1.
72. Prior to passage of the 1982 Constitution Act, the Canadian legal system generally had
not recognized Aboriginal rights as legally enforceable. See Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal
Rights, 66 CAN. B. REV. 727, 727-32 (1987). See generally Johnson, supra note 9.
The Constitution Act, 1982 heralds "a new era in Canadian law and politics," adding a new
dimension to Canadian Constitutional law that bears "the potential to create sweeping changes in
society". Pentney, The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada and the Constitution Act,
1982: Part I- The Interpretive Prism of Section 25, 22 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 21, 21 (1988).
73. Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, ch. 11.
74. See, e.g., Pentney, The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada in the Constitution Act,
1982 Part II - Section 35: The Substantive Guarantee, 22 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 207, 210
(1988) ("There are as many views on the meaning and significance of s. 35 as there are authors
who have written about this matter.").
75. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.




regulations allowed.77 He claimed that section 35(1) protected his
Aboriginal right to fish and that the net length regulation and conse-
quent prosecution under the Federal Fisheries Act were therefore
invalid.78
In Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted section 35(1)
for the first time. The Canadian Supreme Court construed this section
as a "strong check on legislative power."' 79 Although not an absolute
shield for recognized rights, section 35(1) places a legally enforceable
obligation on the government to justify any action infringing recog-
nized rights, 0 including federal legislation." Once infringement is
shown, the burden of showing justification is on the government,8 2 and
courts may review the legitimacy of the government's justification.83
The Sparrow justification test consists of two parts. First, the gov-
ernment must have a valid legislative objective that is "compelling and
substantial."" Second, courts must consider the special trust relation-
ship between the government and Aboriginal peoples.8 5 The guiding
principle in this analysis is the "honour of the Crown" in dealing with
Aboriginal peoples.86
This justification process allows courts to ensure that federal powers
are exercised consistently with the government's duty to protect con-
stitutional rights.8 7 By adopting the justification test, the Canadian
Supreme Court sought to accommodate both the power and national
interest asserted by the Crown and the protected Aboriginal rights
asserted by the defendant.88
77. I at 1083-84.
78. Id. at 1083.
79. Id. at 1110. The Canadian Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that
section 35 was merely a preamble and thus of no substantive effect. Id at 1106-08.
80. Id at 1110.
81. Id at 1114. A showing of infringement negates the presumption of the legislation's
validity. See id at 1113-14.
82. Id at 1110.
83. Id at 1109.
84. Id at 1113. The general "public interest" is not a sufficiently specific objective to provide
a workable test of validity. Id
85. Id at 1114. For example, resource conservation to preserve an Aboriginal right is
consistent with the trust obligation, but conservation aimed at preserving a portion of the
resource for non-Aboriginals is not. Id at 1116.
86. Id at 1114.
87. Id at 1119.
88. Id at 1109-10. The Canadian Supreme Court adopted the justificatory process from
Slattery, supra note 72, at 774-82. The substance of the test was the Canadian Supreme Court's
creation. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1109-10. The Canadian Supreme Court affirmed an order




III. TOWARD RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION OF
CORE TRIBAL RIGHTS
Certain tribal rights are fundamental to the cultural and economic
survival of American Indians. These core tribal rights are presently
underprotected from congressional infringement. Following the Spar-
row model, Congress should recognize core rights, establish proce-
dural safeguards for them, and make some congressional trust
obligations legally enforceable. This would be consistent with current
national Indian policy and the federal government's solemn commit-
ment to American Indians.
A. The Problem: Insufficient Protection of Core Tribal Rights From
Congressional Interference
American Indian leaders, Congress, and the executive branch
widely acknowledge that tribal autonomy and sovereign rights to self-
government are essential to Indian cultural and economic survival.8 9
Implicit in the rights to self-government and sovereign power over
land and resources are the tribes' fundamental human rights to exist as
a people, 90 and to grow and change with time. 91 Honoring these rights
respects the values of Indian people and preserves their freedom to
choose their own form of government. 92 Tribal rights to sovereignty
and self-government, the cornerstones of Indian law, therefore deserve
both recognition by the federal government and protection against
unnecessary infringement. 93
The Supreme Court and Congress, however, have failed to protect
core tribal rights from infringement by Congress. Although Indians
are entitled to all the protections provided by the Constitution, the
courts have reduced the effectiveness of limitations on Congress in
Indian cases. For example, the Indian takings doctrine provides less
protection than the takings doctrine that is applied in non-Indian
cases. 94 Furthermore, in Indian equal protection cases, a standard
89. See supra notes 12-16, 54-57 and accompanying text.
90. See Deloria, The Era of Indian Self-Determination: An Overview, in INDIAN SELF-RULE,
supra note 15, at 191, 191-93, 206; see also Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation:
Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 586-602
(1987) (discussing the international human rights law sources for Indian rights to self-
determination).
91. See C. WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 53.
92. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 1020-27, 1050-54.
93. National Congress of American Indians, Major Policy Resolution Number Two: Tribal
Government, N.C.A.I. 33rd Annual Convention (Oct. 21, 1976) (available in University of
Washington School of Law Library).




similar to the rational basis test has replaced the strict scrutiny analy-
sis normally applied to racially discriminatory legislation.95 The
Indian equal protection standard has become one of deference to Con-
gress96 and no longer effectively protects Indians.97 Indians therefore
have neither the protection of strict scrutiny9" nor the assurance that
legislation exempted from strict scrutiny must actually benefit
Indians.99
Moreover, these peculiar constitutional limitations are the only pro-
tection tribes have from Congress' plenary power."°° The congres-
sional trust obligation remains a purely moral obligation that is not
legally enforceable."' Unless Congress violates the Mancari rational
basis standard, it need not even consider its trust obligation when pass-
ing legislation affecting Indians. Non-constitutional claims, such as
protection of sovereignty and self-government, are simply beyond
review except where Congress has provided for review by statute.102
Reduced constitutional protections and the absence of non-constitu-
tional protections demonstrate the perilous position of core tribal
rights under current doctrine. Absent some revolutionary change in
Supreme Court doctrine, Congress may intentionally interfere with tri-
bal sovereignty and self-government."0 3 Moreover, it may inadver-
95. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
96. Newton, supra note 22, at 284-85 ("The only consistent application of Mancari to date
has been to uphold the exercise of congressional power and to justify judicial deference to
Congress.... Whatever Congress wants, Congress gets, and Mancari and its progeny are now
increasingly impressed to serve that end.").
97. Although the standard only condones legislation consistent with "Congress' unique
obligation toward the Indians," legislation need only be rationally related to that obligation.
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974); see also Johnson & Crystal, supra note 45, at 605
("rIThe Court in Antelope seems to imply that Congress always acts in good faith, and any
legislation enacted which singles out Indians for special treatment is presumptively valid -
regardless of detriment or benefit to Indians.").
98. Strict scrutiny may have prevented a situation like that in United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641 (1977) (discussed supra note 51).
99. An actual benefit standard may have prevented a situation like that in Delaware Tribal
Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) (discussed supra note 51).
100. See, ag., Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463, 501 (1979).
101. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text. The only two courts that have reviewed
congressional breaches of trust on the merits did so because they saw the trust as an element of
"Congress' unique obligation" under the Mancari equal protection standard. Littlewolf v. Lujan,
877 F.2d 1058, 1063--64 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 837 (1990) (discussed supra
note 51); Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9, 12-14 (D.D.C.
1990).
102. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
103. See Newton, supra note 22, at 233-34 (citing recent Court decisions that allow
congressional interference with tribal sovereignty under "an inherent Indian affairs power of
almost unlimited scope"); see also Clinton, supra note 13, at 980-84 (discussing legislative
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tently erode tribal sovereignty, both by failing to consider tribal rights
in the legislative process, and by permitting courts and federal agen-
cies to interpret innocent statutory language to the tribes'
disadvantage.
B. The Road to Reform: A Legislative Proposal
The United States should take seriously the Sparrow principle that
the nation's honor is at stake when the government deals with Native
Americans."o Addressing the government's Indian treaty obligations,
Justice Black once observed "[g]reat nations, like great men, should
keep their word."1 5 The United States' commitment to respect and
protect core tribal rights would bring this honorable notion to life.
The United States could protect core Indian rights in several ways.
One way is by adopting a constitutional amendment. °6 The United
States could adopt an amendment like Canada's section 35(1) that
constitutionally recognizes and protects existing aboriginal and treaty
rights. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could overturn key decisions
that have limited review of constitutional claims and have cut off
review of other claims. 107
Given the difficulty of constitutional amendment,10 8 and the
improbability of judicial solutions,"9 federal legislation protecting
core tribal rights is the best way to promote Indian cultural survival.
proposals to abrogate existing Indian rights that resulted from Indian successes in the late 1970s
asserting treaty fishing rights).
104. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1110; see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
552 (1974) (discussing the "solemn commitment of the government toward the Indians").
105. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
106. See, e.g., R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 14, at 279-83 (suggesting a
constitutional amendment recognizing tribes as governmental entities similar to states).
107. For a discussion of possible constitutional rationales that would better protect core tribal
rights, see Newton, supra note 22, at 286-88.
108. The Equal Rights Amendment, for example, that would have affected the rights of over
half of the population of the United States, failed to win ratification despite ten years of trying.
Locin, Steep Hill in Way of Flag Amendment, Chicago Tribune, June 21, 1990, at 14, col. 1. An
amendment to protect core tribal rights, on the other hand, would directly benefit only 0.8
percent of the population of the United States. Chicago Tribune, Mar. 12, 1991, at 5, col. 6
(reporting 1990 census figures).
109. The Court's most recent Indian decisions have demonstrated a distinct hostility to
inherent or reserved Indian rights. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990) (tribes
prevented from asserting minor crime jurisdiction over non-member Indians on the reservation
regardless of resultant law-and-order problems); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 432-33 (1989) (inherent sovereignty of tribe did not
prevent local zoning of non-Indian property in "open" areas of the reservation); see also Note,
The Decline of Tribal Sovereignty: The Journey From Dicta to Dogma In Duro v. Reina, 110 S.
Ct. 2053 (1990), 66 WASH. L. REv. 567 (1991).
1132
Honoring Tribal Rights
Congress has already mustered the political will to recognize Native
American rights.110 It has demonstrated concern for American Indian
prosperity, and, in recent legislation, has recognized the federal
responsibility for furthering that goal." 1 Unlike the courts, Congress
has undisputed power to create enforceable rights, and has created
novel procedural 2 and jurisdictional113 mechanisms for giving force
to its policy choices.
Congress should look to Canada's example to structure a legislative
solution that uses some of the principles developed in Sparrow v. The
Queen.1"I Although Congress will have to modify the Canadian
model to comply with United States constitutional law, the Canadian
Constitution Act and Sparrow are helpful guiding principles for the
legislative effort.
Such legislation should include (1) a statement of national policy
recognizing and protecting core tribal rights, (2) internal procedural
guidelines for Congress to follow when considering future legislation
that may infringe core rights, (3) rules of construction for judicial
interpretation of statutes affecting core rights, and (4) legally enforcea-
ble congressional trust obligations.
L Statement of Policy and Definition of Core Rights
Any legislation that Congress enacts to promote Indian survival
should begin with a statement of national policy recognizing and
affirming core tribal rights. The process of defining core rights should
be one of careful reflection and consensus building in which Native
Americans play a central role. The legislation should either describe
the characteristics of core rights or enumerate the specific rights to be
110. See, eg., the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469
(1978) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996 (West 1981)) (proclaiming respect for Indian
rights and culture, and theoretically affecting the way the entire federal government deals with
Indian peoples).
111. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text; see also Pub. L. No. 101-511,
§§ 8077(b)-(d), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990) (to remedy the emergency situation in Indian
country that resulted from the Supreme Court's decision in Duro, 110 S. CL at 2053, Congress
passed a one year amendment to tribal jurisdictional statutes).
112. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
113. See, eg., the Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, § 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 1049-50 (1946)
(Commission terminated in 1978) (Congress recognized past abuses by the government, created
the Commission, and granted jurisdiction to the Commission and to certain courts to hear
substantive claims against the government for those past abuses). See supra notes 64-70 and
accompanying text.
114. [1990] 1 S.C.1L 1075.
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protected.1 15 The statement should acknowledge these rights as essen-
tial to tribal society and commit the government to protect them
against infringement as part of its trust obligations toward Indians.
Congress should express its intent not to derogate from core rights
absent compelling reason and express language.116
2. Legislative Procedures to Safeguard Core Tribal Rights
Congress should establish internal procedures for considering future
legislation that may affect core tribal rights. The procedural require-
ments should promote the values expressed by the Sparrow test: that
legislation be consistent with the government's solemn trust responsi-
bility toward the tribes.117
Congressional review should seek to avoid infringing core rights
absent compelling need. Where compelling need exists, Congress
should seek to ensure that the legislation is tailored to minimize
infringement. Examples of internal procedures that would further the
Sparrow test values by focusing congressional attention include
mandatory referral to special committees, requirements for comment
from Indian advocacy groups,118 mandatory committee reports con-
sidering the impacts of proposed legislation on core rights and provid-
ing justification for the legislation, and rules governing floor
consideration of legislation affecting core rights.
The idea of Congress agreeing to restrain future legislation is novel
in the Indian law context. Congressional self-restraint has been
accomplished, however, in other contexts. When Congress deems it
important for future Congresses to consider specific issues, it has
developed rules for guiding future legislation. One well-known exam-
ple of such congressional self-restraint is the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings Act. 19 Under that statute, failure to meet budget targets triggers
special legislative procedures that include referral to a temporary spe-
115. The characteristics of core rights should be those that are essential to long term cultural
and economic survival. Examples of specific rights that might be enumerated are sovereignty,
self-government, self-determination, freedom of traditional religious practice, and exclusive
authority to manage lands within reservation boundaries.
116. A congressional commitment to protect core rights, except where sufficient need justifies,
would parallel the position adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court. See, e.g., Sparrow, [1990] 1
S.C.R. at 1109-10; see also supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
118. The Washington State Legislature considered a bill in the 1991 session that would have
allowed four Indian representatives to be non-voting members of the House and Senate. See
Savelle, Maine a Model for State Bill on Indians, Seattle Times, Mar. 8, 1991, at E4, col. 1.
119. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,




cial committee and special rules controlling floor debate. 2° A similar
statute concerning legislation that affects core tribal rights would force
explicit consideration of the impacts of any proposed legislation on
core rights and its justification, thereby minimizing infringement on
core rights.
3. Rules of Construction
The statute should also include rules of construction for interpreting
legislation that may conflict with core rights. These rules should
require that statutes be interpreted consistently with the statement of
policy and protection of core rights. Unless the special legislative pro-
cedures that the proposed statute prescribes are followed, later statutes
should be construed narrowly to avoid infringing core rights.
4. Expanding Legally Enforceable Trust Obligations
Congress should waive the United States' sovereign immunity from
money damage actions and allow compensation for the infringement
of certain core rights. 2 ' Congressional concern about the United
States' liability may encourage more careful consideration of the
impact of legislation on core rights, thus ensuring that Congress will
act consistently with its trust obligations.1 22 The most obvious exam-
120. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings demonstrates that Congress has the power to establish
internal procedures for considering future legislation. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986),
the Supreme Court struck down only those provisions giving legislative functions to the
Comptroller General, leaving in place the "faliback" provisions that included the special
legislative procedures.
121. Congress has the power to waive the United States' sovereign immunity and to confer
jurisdiction on a competent court to hear claims for money damages. See Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335, 1339, 1342-44 (CL Cl. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 950
(1980), where the court noted that Congress could waive sovereign immunity for non-
constitutional congressional breach of trust cases and grant jurisdiction for the court to hear such
claims. Passage of the Indian Claims Commission Act is an example of the exercise of this
power. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
Given the unique nature of the tribal claims that may arise from the proposed legislation, a
special Court of Indian Affairs may be the most appropriate forum for breach of trust claims. A
properly constituted Court of Indian Affairs may be best equipped to hear trust claims because of
its expertise and ability to develop an extensive information base. See generally V. DELORIA, JR.
& C. LYTLE, supra note 13, at 262-63.
122. The statute should also establish a general executive trust obligation to protect and
enhance tribal resources and rights to self-government, enforceable through claims for money
damages, injunction, or declaratory relief. See National Congress of American Indians, Major
Policy Resolution Number One: Treaties & Trust Responsibilities, N.C.A.I. 33rd Annual
Convention (Oct. 21, 1976) (available in University of Washington School of Law Library).
Establishment of such an obligation would resolve the uncertainty raised by United States v.
Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell 1), and United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983)
(Mitchell 11), as to the existence of a general executive trust obligation and waiver of sovereign
immunity for its enforcement. Congress may create substantive rights of action against the
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ple of an infringement that should be compensable by money damages
is Congress' improper management or disposal of tribal lands when
acting as a trustee. 2 ' By creating a right of action for breach of trust,
Congress may exercise greater caution in situations where the
"trustee" exception to the fifth amendment takings doctrine applies.124
C. Benefits and Limitations of a Legislative Solution
This Comment's legislative proposal admittedly would provide less
protection for core rights than does the Canadian Constitution and
Sparrow because future Congresses may repeal any portion of it. In
order to pass exemptions or repeal parts of the legislation, however,
Congress would have to acknowledge its policy shifts deliberately,
publicly, and explicitly. In the absence of a deliberate shift in policy,
such procedural safeguards would help ensure that only those
infringements of core tribal rights that are specifically intended will be
adopted by Congress.
Another problem with the proposed legislation is that Congress may
unduly restrict the circumstances under which its own breaches of
trust may be remedied. Congress' explicit acknowledgment of an
enforceable duty and core tribal rights, however, would provide bene-
fits in addition to enforceability. These benefits include a more unified
approach to Indian policy and better guidance for the courts and the
executive branch in the day-to-day interpretation and implementation
of laws affecting core tribal rights.
Perhaps the most important benefit of the proposed legislation is
that it would fulfill the government's solemn commitment to honor its
agreements with Native Americans and deal with them in good faith.
It would give a solid foundation to the national policy of tribal auton-
omy and self-determination.125 By clearly committing the federal gov-
ernment to protecting core tribal rights, the proposed legislation
would substantiate a policy that often seems little more than artful
government for executive breach of statutory duties. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1986) (citizen suit provisions); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b) (West 1976). The right of action, however, must be explicitly
conferred. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
123. But see supra note 41 (discussion suggesting the difficulty of determining the dollar value
of tribal land). Regardless of the problems of valuation, however, allowing some level of
compensation, or providing some other sanction for congressional breach of trust, is better than
the current situation which exempts Congress from its just compensation constraints when acting
as a trustee.
124. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.




rhetoric under current law.'2 6 To adopt this legislation would honor
promises made to Indian nations to let them live in peace and accord-
ing to their heritage. 27
IV. CONCLUSION
The current legal regime in the United States allows Congress to
interfere with core tribal rights at will. Given the vital importance of
these rights to the future of Indian nations, Congress should acknowl-
edge them and protect them against infringement. Canada's new Con-
stitution Act and the Sparrow decision provide an excellent model for
reform of the relationship between the rights of Indian nations and the
powers of Congress.
This Comment's proposal is drawn from the principles of the recent
Canadian law: that tribal rights should not be infringed absent com-
pelling interest and sufficient justification. The proposal includes both
procedural and substantive safeguards for core tribal rights. Although
these safeguards could be rescinded by future Congresses, they would
nevertheless provide significant benefits by preventing inadvertent
infringement of core rights and forcing any explicit infringement to be
openly debated and publicly acknowledged.
This Comment's proposal calls for a needed change in the legal
regime controlling the relationship between tribal governments and
Congress. By adopting the proposal, Congress would substantiate its
professed policy of Indian self-determination. It would also acknowl-
edge and make real the United States' solemn commitment to respect
the rights of tribes to survive and prosper within our federal system.
Matthew D. Wells
126. See, eg., Slagle, The American Indian Policy Review Commission: Repercussions and
Aftermath, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 115, 119 (American Indian
Studies Center, UCLA ed. 1979).
127. See supra note 12-13 and accompanying text.
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